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Abstract—With the rapid growth of smartphone and tablet
users, Device-to-Device (D2D) communications have become an
attractive solution for enhancing the performance of traditional
cellular networks. However, relevant security issues involved
in D2D communications have not been addressed yet. In this
paper, we investigate the security requirements and challenges
for D2D communications, and present a secure and efficient
key agreement protocol, which enables two mobile devices to
establish a shared secret key for D2D communications without
prior knowledge. Our approach is based on the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement protocol and commitment schemes. Compared to
previous work, our proposed protocol introduces less communi-
cation and computation overhead. We present the design details
and security analysis of the proposed protocol. We also integrate
our proposed protocol into the existing Wi-Fi Direct protocol,
and implement it using Android smartphones.
Index Terms—D2D communications; Diffie-Hellman; Wi-Fi
Direct; key agreement protocol; the man-in-the-middle attack
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence and popularity of personal mobile devices,
such as smartphones and tablets, generates large amount of
data traffic by accessing the Internet and downloading applica-
tions, which imposes a huge burden for the cellular infrastruc-
ture and spectrum. Device-to-Device (D2D) communications
have been introduced to offload the traffic burden from cellular
infrastructure to personal devices [14]. The D2D technology
enables mobile device users directly establish wireless links
between each other, without passing through the public cellular
infrastructure or access points.
Many literatures have studied the application scenarios and
possible technical solutions for D2D communications. In [1],
the authors propose D2D communications as an underlay to
the cellular network, and present a mechanism for integrating
D2D communications into LTE-Advanced network. Yu et al.
[2], [3] discuss the power control issue for D2D communica-
tions, and derive an optimum power allocation for D2D links
under cellular network control. The work in [4] proposes to
use Wi-Fi based D2D links among cellular users to improve
the overall network performance in uplink transmission.
Wi-Fi Direct, initially called Wi-Fi P2P, is a Wi-Fi standard
that enables devices to easily establish D2D connections using
the Wi-Fi frequency band. [5] gives a wide overview and
experimental evaluation of the Wi-Fi Direct protocol. [6] con-
siders the practical implementation challenges of Wi-Fi Direct
and shows that the Wi-Fi Direct features allow deploying the
D2D paradigm on top of the LTE cellular infrastructure.
Though D2D communication has been a hot research topic
in recent years, there is not much study focusing on the
security aspect of D2D communications. [10] and [11] discuss
the physical layer solutions for secure D2D communications,
but their techniques are difficult to be implemented using
devices on the market.
In fact, due to the broadcast nature of wireless communica-
tion, wireless channels are considered vulnerable to a variety
of attacks, and security is one of the major concerns for D2D
communications. To secure the communication between two
end users of a D2D link, establishing a shared secret key is the
first and most significant step. However, lack of trusted third
party and infrastructure under D2D connection environment
makes this step a non-trivial task. The well-known Diffie-
Hellman key agreement protocol enables two parties jointly
establish a shared secret key without any prior knowledge.
However, this protocol is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle
attack (MITMA) [12]: an active adversary makes independent
connections with the victims, making them believe that they
are talking directly to each other. To address this issue,
researchers have come up with various Diffie-Hellman based
cryptographic protocols, which can prevent the MITMA by
conducting mutual authentication.
One simple protocol was suggested in [7], in which devices
A and B exchange the hashes of their public keys over a secure
channel, thus performing the mutual authentication. However,
this protocol requires a large number of bits to be mutually
authenticated. The MANA protocol in [8] reduces the size of
the authentication message to k bits, but requires a stronger no-
tation of authentication channel. [9] presents a protocol based
on commitment schemes and requires 4-round communication
over the wireless channel. In this paper, we propose a 3-
round key agreement protocol based on commitment scheme.
Our proposed protocol is similar to the protocol in [9], but
with less communication and computation overhead, meantime
achieving the same level of security. Major contributions of
this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We analyze the secure threats and challenges for D2D
communications;
2) We design a secure and efficient Diffie-Hellman based
key agreement protocol, and provide the security analy-
sis;
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3) We integrate our proposed key agreement protocol into
the existing Wi-Fi Direct protocol, and implement it on
Android smartphones.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II introduces the security concerns and challenges for D2D
communications; Section III presents the details of the pro-
tocol design and security analysis; Section IV shows the
implementation of our proposed protocol. We conclude this
paper in Section V.
II. SECURITY CONCERNS OF D2D COMMUNICATION
Despite all the benefits of D2D communications, security
is one of the major concerns that need to be well addressed
before D2D technique gets widely accepted and implemented.
It is well known that due to the broadcast nature of wireless
channels, wireless communication such as Wi-Fi and Blue-
tooth is vulnerable to a variety of attacks that challenges the
three basic principles of security–confidentiality, integrity and
availability. Some common attack vectors include surreptitious
eavesdropping, message modification and node impersonation.
For example, by stealthy listening to the communication
between two devices, an attacker can gain critical or privacy
information, such as trade secrets or identity related informa-
tion. Thus, the D2D communications between devices need to
be properly secured.
To secure the D2D communications, cryptography solutions
are needed to encrypt the messages while they are transmitted
via wireless channels. Numerous encryption algorithms have
been well developed which can provide different security
levels for the encrypted messages, but all of them require
two devices agree on a shared secret (either a shared secret
key or each other’s public keys). Due to the large number
of mobile devices, the diversity of device manufacturers and
lack of standards, preloading secure keys into mobile devices
is neither efficient nor practical. On the other hand, a trusted
third party or infrastructure is not likely to be available in
the D2D mobile environment. Thus, how to establish a shared
secret between devices is one of the main challenges for secure
D2D communications.
One straightforward way to establish a shared secret be-
tween two devices is that the two end users of the D2D
link interactively set up a secret key via human negotiation
(such as making a phone call if they are in distance). The
problem for this is that the shared secret established by human
interaction will be too weak in most cases. The attackers
do not even need to be smart to crack this weak secret via
brute force method, considering current computation power.
To deal with this issue, cryptologists and researchers come up
with two types of approaches which enable two individuals
to establish a secure enough secret key: Diffie-Hellman key
establishment protocol and secret key extraction from physical
channel characteristics.
Physical layer based secret key generation methods have
been proposed in recent years as alternative solutions for tra-
ditional Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. Unlike Diffie-
Hellman key agreement protocol, whose security is guaranteed
by the computational hardness of discrete logarithms, these
physical layer based methods rely on the randomness and
uniqueness of wireless fading channel properties: temporal
variation, spatial variation and reciprocity. Generally, the two
devices first send channel probing packets to measure the
physical metrics of the wireless channel, then after using
quantization and error correction technique, these two devices
can yield the same secret key. The main problem for this
type of methods is that the secret key generation rate is
in most case very low. Users have to send lots of channel
probing packets to achieve a secret key with enough bits
and randomness. The communication overhead and relatively
longer key generation time are not quite desirable for the case
of D2D communications.
Diffie-Hellman cryptosystem is the oldest public key system
still in use, which allows two individuals to agree on a shared
secret key, even though they can only exchange messages over
public channels. Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol works
as follows: Assume p and q are publicly known to two devices
A and B (if not, A can put them into its message and send
it to B), A and B both randomly generate a value a and b.
A computes ga mod p and sends it to B, correspondingly, B
computes gb mod p then sends it to A. At the last stage, A
computes s = (ga)b mod p, B computes s = (ga)b mod p.
Both A and B will arrive at the same value, since (ga)b and
(ga)b are equal mod p. (ga)b mod p will be the established
shared secret between A and B, thus can be subsequently
used as encryption key for future communication. The imple-
mentation of Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol requires
some extent of computation capacity, since p, a, and b can
be quite large numbers. However, mainstream mobile devices
on today’s market have achieved gigahertz level processor
frequency, so generating a secure enough shared secret, say,
156 bits, can be conducted within seconds.
As is well known, the above Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol is vulnerable to the so called the man-in-the-middle
attack. Since ga and gb are transmitted over the public channel,
there is no way for device A to know for sure whether gb
comes from device B, vice versa. Devices A will establish
a shared secret with whoever transmits gb, and it certainly
might not be device B. The essential reason that the MITMA
is possible is that there is no mutual authentication between
these two devices. To provide the desired authentication, one
intuitive solution is both devices put the obtained secret key to
a one-way hash function, e.g. MD5, to generate a hash value
h(K), then compare the hash value via a trusted channel (for
example, output the computed hash code on device screens
and perform visual or verbal comparison). If the mutual
authentication process agrees, then both devices can confirm
that they have established a shared secret key with each other.
The main issue about the above mutual authentication
procedure is that the number of bits needed to be checked
by the user is too large. The output of a hash function is
usually over 128 bits (32 hexadecimal digits), and visually or
verbally checking them is a non-trivial task. Using truncation
of the hash code can drastically reduce the number of digits
Fig. 1. Secure Key Exchange Protocol
needed to be checked, but doing this will introduce serious
security weakness. In [8], the authors describe one possible
way to attack the truncated hash code: an attacker with
significant computing resources can crack a 32 bits truncated
hash code in less than 1 second. Through the analysis above,
to secure the D2D communications, we need a key agreement
protocol that enables two mobile devices to securely establish
a shared secret key, at the meantime requires minimum amount
of information to be mutually authenticated to prevent the
MITMA.
III. PROPOSED KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
A. Problem Statement
We consider the following scenario. Two mobile device
users want to establish a shared secret key for their D2D
communications. Both of them are equipped with a smart-
phone or tablet which is capable of communicating over a
wireless channel. Both devices have the computation capacity
to perform Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, and are
capable of displaying sequence of digits. The two users do
not have any pre-shared cryptographic information, and there
is no trusted third party or infrastructure available. They can
visually or verbally recognize each other for the purpose of
mutually authenticate a short message.
B. Assumptions
We assume devices A and B agree on a finite cyclic group
G, its generating element g, and a large prime number p. We
assume G to be a subgroup of Z∗p of prime order q, where, Z∗p
is the multiplicative group consists of nonzero integers modulo
p.
We consider the Dolev-Yao adversary model [12]: The
attacker has fully control over the wireless channel. It can
overhear, intercept, and modify any message. The attacker can
also initiate a conversation with any other user. We further
assume that legitimate users will follow the protocol and are
not compromised.
C. Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme allows one user to commit to a
chosen value or statement while keep it hidden to others,
with the ability to reveal the commitment value latter. A
commitment scheme has the following two main properties:
1) a user cannot modify the value or statement after they have
committed to it; that is, the commitment scheme is binding and
2) the receiver can only know the committed value after the
sender “opens” it; that is, the commitment scheme is hiding.
A commitment scheme is defined by two algorithms Commit
and Open:
Commit. (c, d) ← m transforms a value m into a com-
mitment/open pair (c, d). The commit value c reveals no
information of m, but with decommit value d together (c, d)
will reveal m.
Open. m ← (c, d) output original value m if (c, d) is the
commitment/open pare generated by Commit(m).
D. Protocol Design
Here we present our design of the key agreement protocol,
which is based on the traditional Diffie-Hellman key agree-
ment protocol and a commitment scheme. In out protocol,
two mobile users A and B respectively generate k-bit random
strings NA and NB , and NA⊕NB as the short authentication
string for mutual authentication.
Fig. 1 shows the message flow of our proposed proto-
col. At the initial stage, user A and B select their Diffie-
Hellman parameter a and b, then compute ga and gb. A
and B randomly generate their k-bit strings NA and NB .
mA = IDA‖ga‖NA and mB = IDB‖gb‖NB are formed by
concatenation, in which IDA and IDB are human readable
identifiers for user A and B, such as names or e-mail addresses.
A also needs to calculates the commitment/opening (c, d) for
mA = IDA‖ga‖NA.
After the initial stage, user A and user B perform the
following message exchange over their D2D communications
channel. User A sends the c, the commitment value of mA
to user B; after receiving c, user B sends mB to user A. In
return, user A sends the decommit value d to user B. User B
opens the commitment and gets mA = IDA‖ga‖NA.
In the final stage, user A and B generate the k bits authenti-
cation string by SA = NA⊕N′B and SB = N′A⊕NB , in which
N′B and N
′
A are derived from messages received by A and B.
Then user A and B verify if SA = SB via trusted channel
(visual or verbal comparison). If the authentication strings
match, A and B accept each other’s Diffie-Hellman parameters
and calculate the shared secret key K = gab mod p. The
reason for comparing authentication string before generating
Diffie-Hellman secret key is that if the strings do not match,
both users can save the computation for secret key generation.
E. Security Analysis
In our security analysis, we assume the commitment scheme
we use to be an ideal commitment scheme. That is, no attacker
can forge an m′ which yields a commitment value c′ such that
c′ = c (c is the commitment value of original message m); and
no attacker can open a commitment with d′ 6= d. We further
assume that both NA and NB generated by devices A and B
are perfectly random.
Notice that in our proposed protocol, any party has to com-
mit on an m′A before actually seeing mB ; and any party has
to submit an m′B before actually seeing mA. These statements
directly follow from the binding and hiding properties of the
commitment scheme. Thus, no matter what attacking strategy
the attacker applies, it has to first commit to or submit its
own m message. Suppose the attacker E initiate a protocol
with user B pretending itself to be A, it will first commit to
an mE = IDA‖ge‖NE and send the commit value cE to B.
After getting the reply message mB , the attacker can modify
mB into m′B = IDB‖ge‖NB and forward it to A. But when it
comes to the final stage of the protocol, A and B will compare
SB = NB⊕NE with SA = NA⊕NB . The only chance that A
and B agree on the authentication string is NE = NA. Due to
the binding property of the commitment scheme, the attacker
E cannot modify NE after it sends out its commitment. The
probability that E launch a successful attack is at most 2−k
(k is the number of bits of the authentication string). If the
attacker launch an attack by replying ME = IDB‖ge‖NE to
a protocol initiator A, similar analysis follows.
The bit length k of authentication string can be tuned to
balance the trade-off between security level and usability. With
a larger k, users gain higher security level but need to compare
a longer authentication string. Usually we consider 20 bits (5
hexadecimal digits) to be securely enough, this will give us a
security level roughly equal to an ATM machine.
IV. PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we integrate our proposed key agreement
protocol into the existing Wi-Fi Direct protocol. We call
this enhanced version “Secure Wi-Fi Direct” protocol, which
provides secure key establishment functionality for the D2D
connection between two mobile devices. We also implement
the secure Wi-Fi Direct protocol on two Android smartphones.
The implementation result shows that these two phones obtain
a shared secret key at the meantime they establish a D2D
connection.
Fig. 4. Experiment Results
Wi-Fi Direct protocol enables two devices to establish
a D2D connection using Wi-Fi frequency without the help
of access points. Fig. 2 shows the procedure for a D2D
connection establishment using Wi-Fi Direct. First, two de-
vices perform the channel probing and discover each other.
Then the two devices will go through a 3 way handshake
to determine the group owner (works as an access point)
for this D2D connection. After the devices have agreed on
their respective roles, a DHCP exchange will be conducted
to set up the IP addresses for both devices. Thus, the D2D
connection between these two devices has been established.
We add our proposed key agreement protocol on top of the
existing Wi-Fi Direct protocol, as is shown in Fig. 3. After the
address configuring phase, the two devices will go through
our proposed key agreement protocol as well as the mutual
authentication process to agree on a shared secrete key. As
long as the two devices have agreed on the authentication
message, they can subsequently use their shared secret key
for future communication.
We implement the secure Wi-Fi Direct protocol on two
Android smartphones. The model and operation system of the
smartphones we use is Nexus 5 and the newest AndroidOS-4.4
KitKat. We build our application based on the Wi-Fi Direct
Demo application in [13]. Our secure protocol is implemented
by programming the Android TCP socket. The result is shown
in Fig. 4. We list some of the Diffie-Hellman parameters,
Fig. 2. Wi-Fi Direct Protocol
Fig. 3. Secure Wi-Fi Direct Protocol
as well as authentication N strings in hexadecimal. We use
a 40 digits p value, which gives us a roughly 130 bits
secret key. The authentication string length is set to be 20
bits (5 hexadecimal digits), which is easy to be compared
by the two users and can achieve a strong security level.
The overall running time for our security protocol, excluding
the user-conducted mutual authentication part, including the
computation time as well as the communication delay, is trivial
on Nexus 5 smartphone with its 2.26 GHz processor.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the secure requirements and
challenges for secret key establishment between two mobile
devices. The proposed key agreement protocol enables two
mobile users to securely set up a secret key with a small
computation cost and low mutual authentication overhead.
The security analysis of the proposed protocol shows that the
probability for an attacker to launch a successful attack is at
most 2−k, where k is the number of bits used for authenti-
cation strings. We also integrated our key agreement protocol
into the existing Wi-Fi Direct protocol, and implemented it
using real smartphones. The implementation result shows that
our proposed protocol is efficient, and achieves high level of
usability.
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